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Abstract. The work done  in the  philosophy of modeling  by  Vaihinger (1876), Craik (1943),
Rosenblueth and Wiener (1945), Apostel (1960), Minsky (1965), Klaus (1966) and Stachowiak
(1973)  is still almost completely neglected in the mainstream literature.  However, this work
seems  to  contain  original  ideas  worth  to  be  discussed.  For  example,  the  idea  that  diverse
functions of models can be better structured as follows: in fact, models perform only a single
function – they are replacing their target systems, but for different purposes. Another example:
the idea that  all of cognition is  cognition in models or by means of models. Even perception,
reflexes and instincts (animal and human) can be best analyzed as modeling. The paper presents
an analysis of the above-mentioned work.
1. Introduction
For a unique exposition of the history of modeling (and the very term “model”) from the
ancient mythologies on – see Roland Müller (1983) (an extended version of the paper
and English translation are available online).  Of the pre-1975 proponents of general
philosophies  of  modeling  Müller  mentions  Hans  Vaihinger,  Leo  Apostel,  Patrick
Suppes,  Georg  Klaus  and  Herbert  Stachowiak.  Only  Stachowiak's  approach  is
acknowledged as, indeed, a general philosophy of modeling, and is represented in detail.
However, Stachowiak's work is completely ignored by philosophers writing in English.
His  book “Allgemeine Modelltheorie” was published by Springer  Verlag in  1973.  A
book  named  “General  Theory  of  Models”  published  in  the  West,  how  could  it  go
completely unnoticed? 
Similarly, in a prominent account of the philosophy of modeling written by Frigg and
2Hartmann (2012), of the pre-1975 proponents of general philosophies of modeling only
the following are mentioned: Vaihinger, Apostel, Mary Hesse and Patrick Suppes. With
the due honor – only Hesse and Suppes.
But,  in fact,  the first  version of a general  philosophy of modeling was proposed in
Vaihinger's book “Die Philosophie des Als Ob” (written in 1876, published in 1911).
Vaihinger's  work  is  still  almost  completely  neglected.  Even  his  grave  in
Gertraudenfriedhof (Halle, Germany) seems to be lost.
Kenneth Craik published his book “The Nature of Explanation” (1943) two years before
his  death  at  the  age  of  31.  It  contains,  in  fact,  a  general philosophy of  modeling,
covering  mathematical  and  theoretical  models  of  any scale.  But  this  advanced  and
general aspect of Craik's philosophy is almost completely ignored. Craik's contribution
is somewhat acknowledged only as a precursor of mental model theories.
These, and some other neglected pages of the history are presented in Section 3 below.
Section 2 contains, for a better orientation, a summary of some ideas and distinctions
referenced in Section 3. 
2. Philosophy of modeling: some ideas and distinctions
When  people  are  trying  to  propose  a  unifying  answer  to  the  question  “What  are
models?”, they are forced to struggle with the diversity of uses of the term “model” in
science. Thus, for example, Leo Apostel started his seminal paper (1960) by recognizing
nine of the “main motives underlying the use of models”. However, at the end of his
paper Apostel proposed (as a “hint”) the first unifying idea (details below): the diverse
functions of models can be better structured as follows: in fact, models perform only a
single function – they are replacing their target systems, but for different purposes.
Much later,  Jeff  Rothenberg (1989) proposed an elegant  concise formulation of this
idea:
“Modeling in its broadest sense is the cost-effective use of something in place of something else for some
cognitive purpose.” (p. 75)
Isn't this idea worth to be discussed? 
Another principal idea was proposed by Stachowiak (1973):
“Hiernach,  ist  alle  Erkenntnis  Erkenntnis in Modellen oder durch Modelle,  und jegliche menschliche
3Weltbegegnung überhaupt bedarf des Mediums “Modell”: ...”( p. 56) 
“Therefore, all of cognition is  cognition in models or  by means of models, and  in general,  any human
encounter with the world needs “model” as the mediator: …”
Stachowiak  called  this  approach  “the  model-based  concept  of  cognition”  [das
Modellkonzept der Erkenntnis], or “modelism” [Modellismus, details below].
As a hypothesis, this idea was proposed already by Craik (1943):
“It is generally agreed that thought employs symbols such as written or spoken words or tokens; but it is
not generally considered whether the whole of thought may not consist of a process of symbolism , nor is
the nature  of  symbolism and its  presence  or  absence  in  the  inorganic  world discussed.”  (p.  58,  my
emphasis added) 
Craik is using “process of symbolism” as a synonym of modeling (details below).
Thus,  models  are  ubiquitous  in  cognition.  Even  perception,  reflexes  and  instincts
(animal and human) can be best analyzed as modeling. “Cognition is Modellismus.”
Isn't this second idea worth to be discussed as well? 
The  third  idea  is  more  happy:  if  we need  models,  we  need  also  means  of  model-
building. Theories (“theoretical laws”) are “less nobler than is usually thought”. Their
principal purpose is model-building. In all of its generality, this idea was introduced by
Nancy Cartwright (1983) as “a simulacrum account of explanation”:
“The appearance of truth [of fundamental laws] comes from a bad model of explanation, a model that ties
laws directly to reality.  As an alternative to the conventional picture I propose a simulacrum account of
explanation.  The  route  from  theory  to  reality  is  from  theory  to  model,  and  then  from  model  to
phenomenological law. The phenomenological laws are indeed true of the objects in reality—or might be;
but the fundamental laws are true only of objects in the model.” (p. 4)
More specific versions of this idea were proposed earlier by Suppes (1960), Apostel
(1960), Mario Bunge (1969, 1973,  pp. 42-47 ) and Ronald Giere (1979, pp. 80-81).
[However, I would invite the actual participants of the story to provide a more detailed
account.]
Two extreme kinds of modeling
The simplest kind of modeling is creating of models of fully observable target systems,
by omitting the details that are not important for the purpose of modeling (abstraction),
or by replacing of complex structures by simpler ones (idealization). The relationship of
such  models  to  their  targets  is  expressed  as  “isomorphism”,  “homomorphism”,
4“similarity”, etc. Let us call this extreme kind modeling-by-simplification.
More sophisticated kinds of modeling involve setting of non-fully-observable structures
behind  the  observable  picture,  for  instance,  epicycles,  heliocentric  system,  elliptic
orbits,  gravitation,  molecules,  atoms,  electrons,  photons,  protons,  quarks,  tectonic
plates,  black  holes,  Big  Bang,  human  evolution,  DNA,  Late  Bronze  Age  collapse,
Vandalic language,  assassination of John F. Kennedy,  etc.  Such structures cannot be
fully “discovered”, their non-observable parts can only be invented (or, derived from
other inventions). As put by Albert Einstein (1930, another neglected page of history?): 
"It seems that the human mind has first to construct forms independently, before we can find them in
things. Kepler’s marvelous achievement is a particularly fine example of the truth that knowledge cannot
spring  from experience  alone,  but  only from the  comparison  of  the  inventions  of  the  intellect  with
observed fact."
Let us call this second extreme kind modeling-by-invention. Relationship of invented
models to their targets is more complicated than isomorphism, similarity etc. Of course,
in real modeling situations, both paradigms can be mixed.
3. Philosophy of modeling: some neglected pages of history
A tribute to Hans Vaihinger (1876)
The first edition of Vaihinger's book “Die Philosophie des Als Ob” was published in
1911.  However,  the  principal  chapters  of  it  (Part  I)  reproduce  parts  of  Vaihinger's
Habilitationsschrift written during the autumn and winter months of 1876 (hence, at the
age of 24). Part I is extended by Part II based on texts written during 1877-1879, when
Vaihinger started to prepare a book. But the project was interrupted for about 25 years,
and was completed only in 1911. For more details, see Fine (1993) and Simon (2014). 
The idea that Vaihinger's “fictionalism” is relevant to philosophy of modeling is due to
Fine:
“Preeminently, the  industry devoted to modeling natural phenomena, in every area of science, involves
fictions in Vaihinger's sense.  If you want to see what treating something “as if” it were something else
amounts to, just look at most of what any scientist does in any hour of any working day.” (p. 16)
“... the dominant self-conception of postwar science has been that of sciences as the builder of useful
models.  Vaihinger  was  surely  the  earliest  and  most  enthusiastic  proponent  of  this  conception,  the
preeminent twentieth-century philosopher of modeling.” (p. 18)
5For a similar conclusion, see Suárez (2009):
“Vaihinger's  work  is  unfortunately  not  sufficiently  well  known  today,  but  he  should  appear  to
philosophers of science as an extremely contemporary figure.” (p. 158)
Thus, some of the philosophers of science already are analyzing Vaihinger's work with
sympathy. However, it seems to me, he deserves more. 
I  am  preparing  a  separate  paper  “A  Tribute  to  Hans  Vaihinger”.  The  summary
(somewhat  purified  of  Vaihinger's  in-consequences  and  faults)  will  be  as  follows:
Vaihinger's  1876 “fictionalism” was,  in  fact,  the  first  explicitly  formulated  general
philosophy of modeling.
A tribute to Kenneth Craik (1943)
Craik's book “The Nature of Explanation” (1943) was published two years before his
death  at  the  age  of  31.  As  we  will  see,  it  contains,  in  fact,  an  advanced  general
philosophy of modeling, covering mathematical and theoretical models of any scale.
But  this  advanced  aspect  is  largely  ignored  by  the  community  of  philosophers  of
science. Craik's contribution is somewhat acknowledged only as a precursor of the line
of thought started by Johnson-Laird (1980) – the small scale mental model theory.
The summary of Craik's proposal is expressed strikingly at the end of the book: 
“Assuming then the existence of the external world I have outlined a symbolic theory of thought, in which
the nervous  system is  viewed as  a  calculating machine capable  of  modelling or  paralleling external
events, and have suggested that this process of paralleling is a basic feature of thought and of explanation.
The possessor of a nervous system is thus able to anticipate events instead of making invariable empirical
trial.” (pp. 120-121, my emphasis added)
In the Preface, Craik calls this proposal “the 'paralleling' theory of thought” (p. VIII),
and in the Postscript – “the 'modelling' theory of thought” (p. 124).
In the Introduction, Craik proposes to apply in philosophy the well-known scientific
procedure – “induction supported by experiments to test hypotheses” (p. 1).
In the short Ch. I “The function and the importance of explanation”, Craik does not
explain what explanation is, he only describes it as a phenomenon, and mentions “five
main  attitudes”  to  it:  apriorism,  skepticism,  descriptive  theories,  relational  theories
(quantum mechanics), and his preference – causal theories (pp. 7-8, i.e. theories based
on – I would call it – the causal paradigm). 
6In  Ch.  II  “A priorism and  scepticism”,  Craik  analyzes  the  first  two attitudes  –  the
philosophical principles proposed by Descartes, Hume, Berkeley, Whitehead and Ayer.
His extremely radical analysis leads to the conclusion that all principles pretending to be
a priori valid, can only be “dogmatically asserted”. All attempts to justify their absolute
validity, when “carefully followed out”, not only fail, they show “the greatest ignorance
of the real nature of things”: 
“It is, curiously enough, a priorism – the endeavour to obtain the greatest certainty – which leads to the
greatest  ignorance  of  the  real  nature  of  things,  and,  carefully  followed  out,  even  to  admission  of
ignorance, in scepticism.” (p. 25)
Complete  skepticism  is  usually  criticized  as  a  self-refuting  position  (however,  see
Stegmüller's  (1954) counter-argument). But Craik's assessment is  even more radical:
complete  skepticism,  taken seriously (“carefully followed out”),  can  be “reduced to
silence” (p. 26), because one cannot allow complete skeptics to use human language for
expression of their opinions: 
“Thus the use of language itself is based on the principle that any symbolism which works has objective
validity; and it is illegitimate to use words to contradict this principle.” (p. 27)
As an alternative to dogmatism and skepticism, Craik proposes to rely on “symbolisms
that work”, such as human language:
“Thus  we  do  not  try  to  prove the  existence  of  the  external  world  –  we  discover it,  because  the
fundamental  power  of  words  or  other  symbols  to  represent  events …  permits  us  to  put  forward
hypotheses and test their truth by reference to experience. ... A particular type of symbolism may always
fail in a particular case, as Euclidean geometry apparently fails to represent stellar space; but if all types
of symbolism always failed, we should be unable to recognise any objects or exist at all.” (p. 29)
Throughout  the  book,  Craik  is  applying  the  term “symbolism”  to  means  of  model
building:  theories,  mathematical  structures  and human language.  Craik's  considering
human language as an experimentally established means of model-building (instead of
mystifying its capacities) should be qualified as an extremely advanced idea.
Unfortunately, Ch. III “Relational and descriptive theories” can be used by critics to
discredit Craik as a modern thinker. Here, he is trying to protest against applying of
quantum theory in its current state to draw the ultimate conclusion that indeterminism is
“a characteristic of real phenomena“:
“I  am  not  trying  to  belittle  the  achievements  of  quantum  mechanics  in  covering  and  predicting
phenomena.” (p. 38)
7“There  is  only a  difference  in  attitude  to  microscopic events  where  most  quantum physicists  regard
indeterminism as a characteristic of real phenomena and I (tentatively, because I am unable to follow the
mathematical detail of their theories) do not." (p. 30)
The first argument:
“Neither  the  limit  of  observation  imposed  by  the  disturbing  influence  of  the  observing  electron  or
quantum, nor the intangible nature of the conception of a wave-particle justifies us, surely,  in imposing
on reality the burden of supporting the short-comings of our own intellects and instruments.” (p. 32)
“I am only asking them [physicists] to refrain from saying that reality must have the same limitations as
their methods of observation. Science surely is an attempt to find out the nature of reality by experiment,
theoretical formulation of hypotheses, and verification; not an attempt to assert that reality has the same
limitations as our methods of observation.” (p. 39) 
The second argument: according to Craik's intuition, behind the probability distributions
of quantum theory there must be some “real” causal mechanism (we would say, some
local hidden variable mechanism) to be discovered later. His line of argument shows
that he is treating quantum probabilities in the classical way (as a probability space
obeying Kolmogorov axioms). However, despite the naivety of his arguments, Craik is
here in a good company with Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen.
In Ch. IV “On causality” Craik continues to argument in favor of his belief in the causal
paradigm as a potentially universal means of model-building:
“I do not mean that it [Craik's argument] is a way of demonstrating [by a logical proof] the existence of
causality, but only that it shows some of our words and concepts to be so pervaded and saturated with
causality that no formal analysis, however rigorous, will rid them of causality...” (p. 42). 
“... most of the great hypotheses and experiments of Newton, Maxwell, Rutherford, Darwin and the rest
have been inspired by the idea of tracing the action of causes in nature.”(p. 46)
“... we are admittedly unable to probe causation to the bottom and find ultimate links and a first cause; but
this  limitation  on  our  thought  … is  no  sufficient  reason  for  rejecting  the  idea  that  reality  may  be
constituted in this [i.e. causal] way. We should try out the idea as long as it works and suggests definite
consequences.” (p. 47)
Thus, Craik rejects both naive realism and complete skepticism, and he is aware that
the causal  paradigm cannot  be justified “logically”,  i.e.  in  the  absolute  sense  many
people are awaiting. But “we should try [it] out as long as it works”. As noted by Barrett
(2001), Charles Peirce in his seminal papers (1877, 1878) considered the entire science
as a temporarily consistent system of such “working” constructs.
In the central chapter of the book – Ch. V “Hypothesis on the nature of thought”, Craik
8takes  “the  existence  of  the  external  world  and  of  causation  for  granted”  and  is
“advancing a hypothesis” (p. 50). Namely:
“My hypothesis then is that thought models, or parallels, reality – that its essential feature is not 'the
mind', 'the self', ‘sense-data’ nor propositions but symbolism, and that this symbolism is largely of the
same kind as that which is familiar to us in mechanical devices which aid thought and calculation.” (p.
57)
Craik  is  using  the  verbs “model”,  “parallel”,  “imitate”,  and the  nouns “modelling”,
“paralleling”, “symbolisation” as synonyms. However,  symbolization possess more a
flavor of means of model-building. 
The starting point of his argument: “One of the most fundamental properties of thought
is its power of predicting events.” “Here there are three essential processes”: translation,
reasoning and re-translation: “External processes” are translated into “words, numbers
or  other  symbols”,  after  this,  reasoning  arrives  at  “other  symbols”,  which  are  re-
translated back into “external processes” (p. 50). 
The next step of the argument – a mechanical analogy:
“Surely, however, this process of prediction is not unique to minds, though no doubt it is hard to imitate
the flexibility and versatility of mental prediction. A calculating machine, an antiaircraft "predictor," and
Kelvin's tidal predictor all show the same ability.” (p. 51)
These  imitating  “mechanical  devices  or  models”  are  “cheaper,  or  quicker,  or  more
convenient in operation” (p. 51).
At this point, Craik introduces his definition of physical (material) models:
“By a model we thus mean any physical or chemical system which has a similar relation-structure to that
of the process it imitates.  By 'relation-structure' I do not mean some obscure non-physical entity which
attends the model, but the fact that it is a physical working model which works in the same way as the
process it parallels, in the aspects under consideration at any moment.” (p. 51)
And  immediately,  he  transfers  this  definition  from  physical  models  to  “neural
machinery”: 
“... I have tried, in the succeeding pages, to indicate what I suspect to be the fundamental feature of neural
machinery – its power  to parallel or model external events – and have emphasised the fundamental role
of this process of paralleling in calculating machines.“(p.52)
“Without enquiring into the relation between such neural patterns and the unitary symbols of thought –
words, numbers, etc. – we can study to some extent the scope and limits of this modelling or imitative
process, by studying the scope and limits of the two great classes of symbols – words and numbers.” (p.
53)
9“Perhaps the extraordinary pervasiveness of number,  and the multiplicity of operations which can be
performed on number without leading to inconsistency, is not a proof of the 'real existence' of numbers as
such, but a proof of the extreme flexibility of the neural model or calculating machine. This flexibility
renders a far greater number of operations possible for it than for any other single process or model.” (p.
53-54)
“We  have  now  to  enquire  how  the  neural  mechanism,  in  producing  numerical  measurement  and
calculation, has managed to function in a way so much more universal and flexible than any other. Our
question, to emphasize it once again, is not to ask what kind of thing a number is, but to think what kind
of  mechanism  could  represent  so  many  physically  possible  or  impossible,  and  yet  self-consistent,
processes as number does.” (p. 55)
See also pp. 75-76 in Ch. VI.
The idea that “numerical symbolism” is ubiquitous in modeling because, as a structure,
it is “much more universal and flexible than any other”, has it been proposed elsewhere
– before or after Craik? 
Craik  is  unique  also  in  asking  and  answering  the  question:  why,  at  all,  is
modeling/paralleling possible? 
“Of course we have still to face the question why these analogies between different mechanisms – these
similarities  of  relation-structure  –  should  exist.  To  see common principles  and  simple  rules  running
through  such  complexity  is  at  first  perplexing  though  intriguing.  When,  however,  we  find  that  the
apparently complex objects around us are combinations of a few almost indestructible units,  such as
electrons, it becomes less perplexing.” (p. 54)
“This, however, is very speculative; the point of interest for our present enquiry is that physical reality is
built  up, apparently,  from a few fundamental  types of units whose properties determine many of the
properties of the most complicated phenomena, and this seems to afford a sufficient explanation of the
emergence  of  analogies  between  mechanisms  and  similarities  of  relation-structure  among  these
combinations without the necessity of any theory of objective universals.” (p. 55)
“Without falling into the trap of attempting a precise definition, we may suggest a theory as to the general
nature of symbolism, viz. that it is the ability of processes to parallel or imitate each other, or the fact that
they can do so since there are recurrent patterns in reality.” (p. 58-59, my emphasis added)
Thus (in modern terms), the possibility of modeling is built into the structure of the
physical universe. There are fragments of the universe (models) “working in the same
way  in  certain  essential  respects”  as  some  other  fragments  of  the  universe  (target
systems). 
The advantage of “neural modeling” (my term imitating Craik's terminology):
“It is likely then that the nervous system is in a fortunate position, as far as modelling physical processes
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is concerned, in that it has only to produce combinations of excited arcs, not physical objects; its 'answer'
need only be a combination of consistent patterns of excitation – not a new object that is physically and
chemically stable.” (p. 56)
“Mental prediction” in the passage on p. 51 quoted above is the only occurrence of the
term “mental”  in  Ch.  V.  The  term “neural”  is  used  much  more  –  8  times:  neural
machinery, neural pattern (5 times), neural model, neural mechanism. And from the very
beginning of Ch. V (telling about designing of bridges on p. 50), we see that, for Craik,
“neural modeling” includes theoretical and mathematical modeling of any scale, i.e. all
of science, and not only small scale mental models.  
“It is generally agreed that thought employs symbols such as written or spoken words or tokens; but it is
not generally considered whether the whole of thought may not consist of a process of symbolism , nor is
the nature  of  symbolism and its  presence  or  absence  in  the  inorganic  world discussed.”  (p.  58,  my
emphasis added)
The general picture:
“Thus there are instances of symbolisation in nature; we use such instances as an aid to thinking; there is
evidence  of  similar  mechanisms  at  work  in  our  own  sensory and  central  nervous  systems;  and  the
function of such symbolisation is plain. If the organism carries a 'small-scale model' of external reality
and of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is
the best of them, react to future situations before they arise, ...“ (p. 61, my emphasis added)
Instead of the usual rejecting of this hypothesis from the very beginning as implausible,
Craik proposes to find out experimentally where exactly it fails (if it fails).
In Ch. VI “Some consequences of this hypothesis” [Craik's modeling hypothesis] 
“... is tentatively applied to a number of philosophical and psychological problems (such as paradox and
illusion) where ontological explanations, in my opinion, have failed.” (p. 121)
The problems listed in the order of appearance:
meaning (meaningfulness, reference), implication and causality, recognition of identity
and  similarity,  adaptation,  differentiation,  conscious  and  unconscious  processes,
measurement  and  numbers  in  modeling,  possible  neural  correlates  of  numbers,
hypostatisation and naive realism, our internal working model of reality, the whole, its
parts and the problem of emergent evolution, memory and the power to learn, dangers
of introspection, conscious and automatic processes, thought and feelings, selfishness
and hedonism, hysterical conduct and wishful thinking, errors of perception (illusions),
errors  of  thought  (paradoxes),  possible  limitations  of  thought  “to  represent  in  itself
microscopic phenomena” (p. 95, because the causal paradigm being so strongly built
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into our thinking), pleasure and frustration, materialism and dogmatism, immortality of
soul, Craik's specific cognitive optimism (p. 99).
“Our  theory  has  some  bleaker  consequences.  …  What  is  knowledge,  if  we  are  but  a  part  of  the
mechanical system of the world we seek to know? What becomes of our ceaseless effort to explain the
universe we live in, if explanation is but a part of the mechanical process?” (p. 97) 
“This  is  the  one  form of intolerance  I  heartily approve –  an  intolerance  for  those  who will  not  try
experiments but prefer to be dogmatic, ...” (p. 98)
Ch. VII “Methods of testing this hypothesis”, in fact, continues Ch. VI by considering
further  problems:  meaning,  meaninglessness,  types  of  proof,  deductive  proof,  ideal
objects and Platonism (p. 107).
Craik rejects Platonism by proposing a strange replacement:  he  insists that the ideal
geometrical objects represent “the extreme and most clear-cut instances … chosen in the
external world” (p.107-108, i.e., these ideal objects are real?). Thus, it seems, he does
not notice that some of the models are inventions. This looks strange because Craik is
aware that Euclidean geometry and classical mechanics are only “very nearly true” (pp.
4, 95). And that there are “over-simplified models” (p. 108) and “wrong theories” (p.
111). And that if something works, then some other thing does not work. And on pp. 51-
52 Craik even formulates (I would call it) an “under-determination” thesis for physical
models:
“Thus, the model need not resemble the real object pictorially; Kelvin’s tide predictor, which consists of
pulleys on levers, does not resemble a tide in appearance, but it works in the same way in certain essential
respects – it combines oscillations of various frequencies so as to produce an oscillation which closely
resembles in amplitude at each moment the variation in tide level at any place.” (p. 51-52)
However,  Craik  does  not  generalize  this  thesis  to  neural/theoretical/mathematical
models, so he does not recognize the phenomenon as the general possibility of under-
determination. And does not come to the idea that models could be inventions that are
setting non-observable structures behind the observable picture.
Ch. VII is continued by considering yet further problems:
why we tend so  continually to  'classify'  reality  into  objects,  oversimplified  models,
models and analogies, situations when a unique or when several models are possible,
why the simplest explanation (i.e. the one based on fewer postulates) is most likely to be
true, why seeking for mechanisms behind simple phenomena is more important than
trying to explain more complicated facts in terms of these phenomena as 'forces', neural
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associations in the brain.
On pp.  116-120 and in  the  Postscript,  Craik  comments  somewhat  ironically on  the
attempts of sweeping criticism of his theory from the position of naive dualism of mind
and body. 
To  conclude,  let  us  repeat  once  again:  Craik's  conception  covers  theoretical  and
mathematical modeling of any scale, i.e. all of science, and not only small scale mental
models. It represents an attempt of a general philosophy of modeling. 
Arturo Rosenblueth and Norbert Wiener (1945)
In  their  paper  written  in  1945,  Rosenblueth  and  Wiener  (a  physiologist  and  a
mathematician)  recognized  replacing as  the  principal  feature  of  modeling,  and  the
ubiquitous role of modeling in science, however, with an emphasis on modeling-by-
simplification:
“No substantial part of the universe is so simple that it can be grasped and controlled without abstraction.
Abstraction consists in replacing the part of the universe under consideration by a model of similar but
simpler structure. Models, formal and intellectual on the one hand, or material on the other, are thus a
central necessity of scientific procedure.” (p. 316, my emphasis added)
At  the  end  of  the  paper,  they  expressed  a  feeling,  similar  to  the  Dappled  World
Perspective proposed by Cartwright (1999):
“Partial models, imperfect as they may be, are the only means developed by science for understanding the
universe. This statement does not imply an attitude of defeatism but the recognition that the main tool of
science is the human mind and that the human mind is finite.” (p. 321)
A tribute to Leo Apostel (1960)
With Apostel's (1960) paper begins the modern history of attempts to give a unifying
and explicit answer to the question “What are models?”:
“Scientific research utilises models in many places, as instruments in the service of many different needs.
The first requirement a study of model-building in science should satisfy is not to neglect this undeniable
diversity (as has sometimes been done), and, when recognising this multiplicity, to realise that the same
instrument cannot perform all those functions (often the multiplicity of function is recognised but either
not to a full extent, or not with respect to the difference of structure it implies)”. (p. 1)
Apostel started the paper by describing nine of the “main motives underlying the use of
models” in scientific practice. For instance, the first motive in his list:
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“(A) For a certain domain of facts let no theory be known. If we replace our study of this domain by the
study  of  another  set  of  facts  for  which  a  theory  is  well  known, and  that  has  certain  important
characteristics  in common with  the  field  under  investigation,  then  we  use  a  model  to  develop  our
knowledge from a zero (or near zero) starting point.” (p. 1, my emphasis added)
 For example, a model might be selected or built to represent some object, if the latter
“… is too big or too small or too far away or too dangerous to be observed or experimented upon.” (p. 2)
Rothenberg (1989) expressed this idea as the requirement of the “cost-efficiency” of
modeling.
Or, the last of the nine motives (a correct feeling of the theory-model relationship):
“(I) It often occurs that the theoretical level is far away from the observational level; concepts cannot be
immediately interpreted in terms of observations.  Models are then introduced to constitute the bridge
between  the  theoretical  and  observational  levels, the  theoretical  predicates  being  interpretable  as
predicates of the model and the observational predicates being also interpretable as predicates of the
model,  the  model  furnishing  lawful  relationships  between  the  two interpretations.  This  intermediary
model can be used to construct the abstract theory or, once it exists, to find for it domains of application.”
(pp. 2-3, my emphasis added).
As one of the problems caused by the diversity of functions of models, Apostel stated:
“(iv) Can some common feature be distinguished, either among the various aims, or among the various
eventual structures, thus unifying to some extent the family of models?” (p. 3, my emphasis added)
To start solving the problem,
“Let then R(S, P, M, T) indicate the main variables of the modelling relationship. The subject S takes, in
view of the purpose P, the entity M as a model for the prototype T.” (p. 4)
Thus, according to Apostel, modeling is not a binary relationship between the model M
and its target system T, but a four-placed one, involving the subject (model user) S and
the  purpose  P of  modeling  as  well.  He  considers  his  list  of  motives  (functions  of
models) as a classification of purposes. 
At  the  very  end  of  the  paper,  Apostel  proposes  the  idea  that  replacing (already
mentioned throughout the paper) could be the common distinguishing feature of all the
seemingly different “functions of models”: 
“This will be our final and most general hint towards the definition of model: any subject using a system
A that is neither directly nor indirectly interacting with a system B to obtain information about the system
B, is using A as a model for B. The definition of 'using', 'purpose' and 'information about'  are problems
formal pragmatics is already beginning to tackle. While we do not think that this type of definition of the
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concepts seem to us immensely more fruitful), we are convinced at least that a general definition along
these lines is possible, adequate and formal.” (pp. 36-37)
Indeed,  most  of  the  middle  part  of  Apostel's  paper  is  devoted  to  this  “syntactical,
algebraic and semantic study” of models. A similar tendency shows Stachowiak (1973)
– a  considerable  percentage  of  his  pages  is  devoted  to  formal  aspects  of  modeling
(attribute mapping etc.) 
Marvin Minsky (1965)
Minsky was the first to emphasize definitely and explicitly replacing and purpose as the
principal features of modeling: A* is a model of A, if one can use A* in place of A to
answer questions about A. This simple definition was proposed in Minsky (1965):
“If a creature can answer a question about a hypothetical experiment without actually performing it, then
it has demonstrated some knowledge about the world. For, his answer to the question must be an encoded
description of the behavior, inside the creature, of some sub-machine or model responding to an encoded
description of the world situation described by the question. We use the term "model" in the following
sense: 
To an observer B, an object A* is a model of an object A to the extent that B can use A* to answer
questions that interest him about A. 
The  model  relation  is  inherently  ternary.  Any attempt  to  suppress  the  role  of  the  intentions  of  the
investigator B leads to circular definitions or to ambiguities about essential features and the like.” (p. 45)
In an earlier paper (1961), Minsky was already using this notion of model extensively,
but without an explicit definition.
A tribute to Georg Klaus (1966)
Cybernetics-oriented  east-German  philosopher  Georg  Klaus  tried  to  propose  model-
theoretic  arguments  in  favor  of  the  epistemology  of  dialectical  materialism.  These
arguments are analyzed in Section 2.4.2 of Stachowiak (1973).
Klaus's  book  “Cybernetics  and  Epistemology”  [Kybernetik  und  Erkenntnistheorie]
(1966)  works  enlightening  even  today,  and  is  still  worth  of  reading.  Consider,  for
example,  his  cybernetic  assessment  of  Kant's  apriorism  on  pp.  34-37,  where  he
concludes that a priori schemas “have come into being historically” [sind geschichtlich
entstanden, p. 34], and hence are, in fact, only “relative  a priori”. Or, the excellently
written Section 3.3 “Invariantenbildung” (pp. 65-67), for example: 
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“Die unmittelbare Aufgabe unseres Erkenntnisapparates besteht in der Bildung von Invarianten, und zwar
von Invarianten der Wahrnehmung, des Denkens und der Motive.” (p. 65)
“The direct  task of  our cognitive apparatus  is  the formation of invariants,  and namely,  invariants of
perception, thinking and motives.”
“Dennoch  sind  es  gerade  diese  Invarianten,  die,  kybernetisch  gesprochen,  eine  Stabilisierung  des
Verhältnisses  zwischen  Mensch  und  Umgebung  und  zwischen  den  Menschen  selbst  überhaupt  erst
ermöglichen.“ (p. 67).
“Still, exactly these invariants, cybernetically speaking, in the first place, enable a stabilization of the
relationship between humans and environment and between humans themselves.” 
Klaus is trying to derive the possibility of objective knowledge (i.e., knowledge that is
truly  reflecting  the  reality)  by  considering  convergent  sequences  of  models  and
invariants appearing in these sequences. First, on p. 214 Klaus introduces a very specific
sequence of models:
”subject S reflecting on the object O”;
”subject S' reflecting on the subject S reflecting on the object O”;
“subject S'' of reflecting on the subject S' reflecting on the subject S reflecting on the
object O”;
etc.
“In  diesem Falle  verschwindet  die Subjektivität,  wenn wir  die Invarianten finden,  die  den  einzelnen
subjektiven Abbildungen zugrunde liegen. … Selbstverstandlich findet dabei ein fortschreitend tieferes
Eindringen in das Wesen der Sache statt.“ (p. 214)
“In this situation, the subjectivity disappears, when we find the invariants which underlie the particular
subjective reflections. … Certainly,  thereby,  a progressively deeper penetration into the nature of the
matter is taking place.” 
According to  Klaus,  the  most  fundamental  invariant  standing behind these  different
systems of reference, is “what O, in fact, is” [was O tatsächlich ist, p. 218].
On p. 226 Klaus considers sequences of models in a more abstract setting. Let us denote
by S i ' the sequence of models [individuelle, subjektive Ensembles] that are trying to
represent  an  “objective  system”  O.  If  this  sequence  is  created  in  a  process  of
“continuous  improvement”  [ständige Verbesserung],  then  (Klaus  concludes),
lim S i '=O . 
Stachowiak (1973) extrapolates Klaus's argument as follows:
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“Nun  wird  man  Klaus  so  interpretieren  dürfen,  daß keineswegs  nur  eine  bestimmte,  von O1
ausgehende Modell-Iteration die Approximation an das „objektive“ Original O1 leistet. Klaus scheint
zu meinen, daß jede  von O1 ausgehende Modellfolge, sofern nur „echt“ wissenschaftlich modelliert
wurde, auf das „Wesen der Sache“ führen müsse, und zwar dies bei aller geschichtlichen Bedingtheit der
modellbildenden  Methoden.  Hieraus  folgt,  das  alle  solchen O1 -Iterationsfolgen  untereinander
konvergent sein und ein gemeinsames Grenzmodell haben müßten, das das Original – dasjenige, was
O1 „tatsächlich ist“ – vollständig und unverfälscht wiedergibt.” (p. 299) 
However, in the end, Stachowiak qualifies dialectical materialism promoted by Klaus as
a  “dialectically”  weakened  [“dialektisch” abgeschwächte,  p.  299-300] materialistic
version of realism, but still speculative and dogmatic as any realism is:
“Die Setzung absoluter und subjektfrei  objektiver Gegebenheiten kann nur spekulativ sein – oder sie
beruht auf bloßer, unmittelbarer Glaubensüberzeugung.” (p. 300)
“Setting of absolute and subject-free objective realities can only be speculative – or, they are based on
mere unmediated faith conviction.”
“Indes  ist  natürlich  wiederum  die  Neigung  realistischer  Philosophen  verstehbar,  für  Forschungs-
Konvergenzen und Invarianzen  ein „dahinter“ befindliches Reales verantwortlich zu machen, und wo
dieses  bequeme,  über  lange  Zeiten  wissenschaftlich-philosophischer  Erkenntnisbemühungen  hinweg
verwendete Denkmodell lediglich als Hypothese, Orientierungshilfe u. dgl. aufgefast wird, bestehen vom
Standpunkt kritisch-rationalen Philosophierens keine Einwände.” (p. 300-301)
“Wie soll Aufsummierung vieler relativer Wahrheiten eine absolute Wahrheit ergeben?” (p. 302)
“How should a summation of many relative truths produce an absolute truth?“
“Wie  immer  hiernach  „Dialektik“  zu  beurteilen  ist:  sie  bietet  keinen  Rechtfertigungsgrund  für  die
Annahme „überpragmatischer“ Möglichkeiten der Originalerschließung.” (p. 303)
Despite this critical assessment, Klaus must be acknowledged as the author of an idea
that is very important, but is largely ignored in the modern philosophy of modeling:  let
us analyze model sequences appearing as science progresses, and let us try detecting
invariants that appear in these sequences. For obvious reasons, Klaus declared this idea
as  justifying  the  accessibility  of  absolute  truth  in  the  sense  of  the  representation/
reflection-realism. But, in a modern setting, it could be used as a minimalist definition
of truth: doesn't truth consist simply of invariants of successful model-building?
A tribute to Herbert Stachowiak (1973)
Stachowiak's work is completely ignored by philosophers writing in English.
Stachwiak's work on modeling started with two papers, published in 1957 and 1965. His
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first book (1965) contains a detailed analysis, from the cybernetics point of view, of the
available data about the mechanisms of human cognition, but not yet a  general concept
of modeling. When writing this book, the author was not yet aware of the paper Apostel
(1961), as noted on p. 4 of Stachowiak second book (1973).
In his  main  book “Allgemeine  Modelltheorie”  (1973),  Stachowiak refers  to  Apostel
(1961), acknowledging that
“L.  Apostel  hat  schon 1961 ein  gleichfalls  umfassendes,  und  zwar  ebenfalls  abbildungstheoretisches
Modellkonzept entwickelt.” (p. 4)
“L.  Apostel  has  developed,  already  in  1961,  an  equally  all-embracing  and  likewise
representation/reflection-theoretical concept of models.”
In Sections 1.1 and 1.2 of the book, Stachowiak presents his “notes on the history of
thought” [denkgeschichliche Notizen] showing the history of skeptical arguments in the
philosophy of cognition, and observing how “the philosophical thought is moving more
and more away from the myth” [das philosophische Denken dem Mythos mehr und
mehr entfremdet] (p. 8). Section 1.2 is named “Säkularisierung der Erkenntnis”, I would
like to translate this as “Demystification of cognition”.
According  to  Stachowiak,  the  most  important  conclusion  from this  demystification
process is the impossibility of ultimate decision-free justifications  [Unmöglichkeit von
entscheidungs-freien  Letztbegründungen,  p.  45].  As  noted  by  Wolfgang  Stegmüller
(1954,  Section  1.4):  to  avoid  infinite  regress,  circularity  and/or  self-refuting,  any
justification process must be stopped at some point by taking a personal decision to
accept or reject. The consequence is the “three-fold pragmatic relativization” [dreifache
pragmatische Relativierung, p. 133] of the theory of cognition. Namely, in principle,
cognition is:
a) user-dependent (person-, or robot-dependent);
b) intention-dependent;
c) time-dependent (from the prehistoric mythologies on).
Adoption  of  this  conclusion  is  called  “the  pragmatic  decision”  [der pragmatische
Entschluß, p. 50].
Accordingly, for Stachowiak (see Section 1.2.4), the top achievements of the entire past
philosophy of cognition are: a) Popper's critical rationalism (praised and criticized by
Stachowiak),  and  b)  the  “holistic  decision-pragmatism”  [holistische  Dezisions-
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pragmatismus, p. 39] proposed by Morton White in 1956.
At  this  point,  in  Section  1.3,  Stachowiak  proposes  “the  model-based  concept  of
cognition”, or “modelism” [das Modellkonzept des Erkenntnis, Modellismus] – as the
result of the above-mentioned three-fold relativization:
“Das Modellkonzept der Erkenntnis greift den Abbildgedanken der klassischen Erkenntnistheorie auf,
relativiert ihn jedoch im Sinne des pragmatischen Entschlusses. Hiernach ist alle Erkenntnis Erkenntnis
in  Modellen oder  durch  Modelle,  und  jegliche  menschliche  Weltbegegnung  überhaupt  bedarf  des
Mediums „Modell“: indem sie auf das – passive oder aktive – Erfassen von etwas aus ist, vollzieht sie
sich relativ zu bestimmten Subjekten, ferner selektiv – intentional selektierend und zentrierend – und in je
zeitlicher Begrenzung ihres Original-Bezuges.” ( p. 56) 
“The model-based concept of cognition takes the representation/reflection idea of the classical theory of
cognition,  but  relativizes  it  in  the  sense  of  the  pragmatic  decision.  Accordingly,  all  of  cognition  is
cognition in models or by means of models, and in general, any human encounter with the world needs
“model” as the mediator: focusing on – active or passive – comprehension of something, it [cognition]
proceeds  relatively to certain subjects, further  selectively – selecting and centering intentionally – and
depending on the temporal restriction of its relation to the original.”
Thus, here, Stachowiak is promoting the idea that models are ubiquitous in cognition.
However, at this point, he does not present yet a precisely defined concept of models,
except “the representation/reflection idea of the classical theory of cognition, relativized
in the sense of the pragmatic decision”. So, what is for him a model at this point?
“Modell  in  jenem  mehrfach  zu  relativierenden  Sinne  ist  ebenso  die  “elementarste“
Wahrnehmungs-”Gegebenheit“  wie  die  komplizierteste,  umfassendste  Theorie.  Modell  ist  das
vermeintlich objektive Erkenntnisgebilde ebenso wie die Gedankenkonstruktion, die ihre Subjektivität
und Perspektivität betont. Modell ist Newtons Partikelmechanik ebenso wie Rankes Weltgeschichte oder
Hölderlins  Hyperion.  …  Auch  das  umfassende  philosophische  System,... alles  dies  ist  „Modell“,
hinsichtlich  seiner  „Objektivität“  von  der  exakten  naturwissenschaftlichen  Theorie  nur  graduell
unterschieden.” (pp. 56-57)
“… all this differs only gradually from the exact scientific theory in respect of its “objectivity”.”
Thus,  Stachowiak does  not  separate  here  models  from theories.  But  he  qualifies  as
models  not  only  Newton's  particle  mechanics,  but  also  (an  extremely  advanced
opinion!) historical texts (such as Weltgeschichte in 6 volumes, by Leopold von Ranke),
works  of  fiction  (such  as  Hyperion,  a  novel  by  Friedrich  Hölderlin),  and  even
philosophical  systems.  And “all  this  differs  only gradually from the exact  scientific
theory in respect of its objectivity”!
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Only later, in Section 2, Stachowiak proposes his version of “the general concept of
model” [der allgemeine Modellbegriff]. He refers to the results of his own inspection of
the various senses in which the term “model” is used in science, engineering and art (pp.
128-130). He decides to leave out only one of these senses: persons as “models” for  the
work of art. This “leaving out” allows to avoid an undesired connotation.
As  the  result,  Stachowiak  formulates  in  Section  2.1.1  the  three  principal  features
[Hauptmerkmale] of his general concept of model: 
1) Representation/reflection feature [Abbildungsmerkmal]:
“Modelle  sind  stets  Modelle  von  etwas,  nämlich  Abbildungen,  Repräsentationen  natürlicher  und
künstlicher Originale, die selbst wieder Modelle sein können.” (p. 131)
“Models are models of something, namely, [they are] reflections, representations of natural and artificial
originals, that can themselves be models again.”
After this, a long text follows – on the problem of mapping between the attributes of
originals  and  their  models.  Here,  Stachowiak  seems  orienting  us  to  modeling-by-
simplification only. 
2)  Reduction feature [Verkürzungsmerkmal]
“Modelle erfassen im allgemeinen nicht alle Attribute des durch sie repräsentierten Originals, sondern nur
solche, die den jeweiligen Modellerschaffern und/oder Modellbenutzern relevant scheinen.” (p. 132) 
“Models, in general, do not cover all the attributes of the originals they are representing, but only those
[attributes] that seem relevant to the actual model creators and/or model users.”
Thus, again, Stachowiak seems orienting us to modeling-by-simplification.
3) Pragmatic feature [Pragmatisches Merkmal]
“Modelle sind ihren Originalen nicht per se eindeutig zugeordnet. Sie erfüllen ihre Ersetzungsfunktion a)
für bestimmte – erkennende und/oder handelnde, modellbenutzende – Subjekte, b) innerhalb bestimmter
Zeitintervalle und c) unter Einschränkung auf bestimmte gedankliche oder tatsächliche Operationen.
... Modelle sind nicht nur Modelle von etwas. Sie sind auch Modelle für jemanden, einen Menschen oder
einen  künstlichen  Modellbenutzer.  Sie  erfüllen  dabei  ihre  Funktionen  in  der  Zeit,  innerhalb  eines
Zeitintervalls. Und sie sind schließlich Modelle zu einem bestimmten Zweck.” (pp. 132-133)
“Models are not assigned per se uniquely to their originals. They perform their replacement function: a)
for definite – cognitive and/or handling, model-using – subjects, b) within definite time intervals, c) under
restriction to definite operations of thought or fact. Models are not only models of something. They are
also models for somebody, a human or an artificial model user. They perform therefore their functions in
time, within a time interval. And they are finally models for a definite purpose.”
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Thus, Stachowiak emphasizes explicitly replacing and purpose as the principal features
of modeling. And he considers robots as possible model users as well.
“Der  Gewinn  dieser  Vorgehensweise  liegt  auf  der  Hand:  Modellseitig  gewonnene  Einsichten  und
Fertigkeiten lassen sich – bei Erfülltsein gewisser Transferierungskriterien – auf das Original übertragen,
der Modellbildner gewinnt neue Kenntnisse über das modellierte Original, ...” (p. 140)
“The advantage of this way of proceeding is evident: insights and skills obtained on the model-side can be
– certain transference criteria satisfied – transferred to the original, the model-builder obtains [in this
way] a new knowledge about the modeled original, ...” 
Minsky (1965) expressed this idea simply as “a  model of A is used in place of A to
answer questions about A”.
Later,  on  p.  323,  Stachowiak  presents  the  modeling  relationship  as  a  five-placed
predicate Mod(M, O, U, t, P), connecting the model M, the original (target) system O,
the user  U,  the time interval  t, and the purpose  P.  This formulation may have been
inspired by Apostel's (1961) four-placed modeling predicate R(U, P, M, O), see above.
Apostel did not include the time dimension.
In the remaining sub-sections of Chapter 2, Stachowiak considers various classes of
models.  Surprisingly,  many of the instances mentioned here violate the above-stated
“reduction  feature”  (modeling-by-simplification).  The  first  of  such  cases  appear  in
Section 2.2.3.1 “Static mechanical models”:
“…  das  Raumgittermodell  eines  Kristalls,  das  statisch-mechanische  Demonstrationsmodell  etwa  des
Uranium 235-Atoms...” (p. 176)
“… the space-lattice model of a crystal, the static-mechanical demonstration model, for instance, of the
uranium-235 atom...”
In fact, we have here models-inventions of non-fully-observable “originals”, for which
an “attribute mapping” is impossible. (Unless these demonstration models are meant as
obtained  by  visualization  from  some  other  models  –  from  the  corresponding
mathematical models, for example.)
One  of  the  examples  mentioned  by Stachowiak  rises  an  interesting  question  about
human evolution as a model inspired by Darwin's theory of evolution: 
“… das Modell eines Prähominiden (etwa nach K. P. Oakley und G. Heberer für Plesianthropus) hat zum
Original ein aus der weitgehend spekulativen Kombination und Ergänzung von Informationsfragmenten
aufgebautes Vorstellungsgebilde.” (pp. 176, 179)
“... the model of a pre-hominide (for example, Plesianthropus, according to K. P. Oakley and G. Heberer)
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has as its original a notion built from the widely speculative combination and extension of information
fragments.” 
Thus, Plesianthropus is meant here as (in fact, theoretical) reconstruction of a particular
fossil scull found in 1947. I would not call such theoretical reconstructions “originals”.
The entire human evolution as a model of all the fossil remains ever found seems to be a
more productive concept.
In Section 2.2.3.2 “Dynamic mechanical models”,  Stachowiak refers to another  two
models-inventions  of  non-fully-observable  “originals”:  a)  Maxwell's  electromagnetic
theory, the mathematical structure of which was obtained by way of analogy with  fluid
dynamics; and b) planetary model of atoms, obtained also by means of analogy, and
later replaced by a non-visual mathematical formalism – the “atom-system of quantum
mechanics” (p. 184). 
In  Section  2.2.3.5  “Electro-chemical  models”,  Stachowiak  refers  to  the  experiment
invented by Stanley Miller to show, how, in principle, amino acids could be created by
electric discharges in the early atmosphere of Earth (p. 189).
On pp. 208-209 two more arguments in favor of the thesis “all cognition is cognition in
models” are mentioned:
“Die ganze Modellhaftigkeit menschlicher Weltbegegnung wie zwischenmenschlicher Kommunikation ist
gleichsam eingefaltet bereits im Modellcharakter des Perzeptionsgeschehens.” (p. 208)
“An dem Modellcharakter der Perzeptionsgebilde kann auch der Umstand nichts ändern, daß der Zugang
zur Originalseite, d. h. zu den Beschaffenheiten der Signalkonstellationen der Außenwelt, immer nur über
die Bildung interner Außenweltmodelle möglich ist.” (p. 209)
“All  the  model-boundedness  of  human  encounter  with  the  world  as  well  as  the  inter-human
communication is equally involved already in the modeling character of the perception process”.
“The modeling character of perception forms is not changed also by the circumstance that the access to
the original-side, i.e., to the properties of signal constellations from the external world, is possible always
only via building of internal models of the external world.”
In  Section  2.3.3.3  “Metaphysical  models”,  Stachowiak  considers  “total  models”
[Totalmodelle, pp. 238-239], i.e. models of the entire universe, as opposed to “aspect
models” or “partial  models” [aspektive Teilmodelle].  He refers to  the work of Ernst
Topitsch  (1958),  who  was  consistently  applying  the  term  “models”  [Modelle,
Modellvorstellungen] to metaphysical notions and concepts (about 200 times throughout
his 1958 book). According to Topitsch, these models were created mainly by means of
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anthropomorphic, biomorphic, technomorphic, or sociomorphic analogies. Stachowiak's
formulation:
“Andere  Kosmos-Modelle  bedienen  sich  “soziomorpher“  Analogien,  dergestalt  vor  allem,  daß die
Weltordnung  nach  dem  Vorbild  der  Staatsordnung  begriffen  wurde.  Eine  bekannte  Original-Modell-
Beziehung  (Staat  —  Staatsmodell)  wurde  analogisch  auf  eine  noch  aufzubauende  Original-Modell-
Beziehung (Kosmos — Kosmosmodell)  übertragen, die so oder so interpretierte Ordnung der eigenen
Gesellschaft in die kosmische Ordnung projiziert.” (p. 239)
“Other  models  of  the  universe  draw  on  “sociomorphic”  analogies,  …,  where  the  world  order  is
understood after the pattern of  the government system.“
(The idea of anthropomorphic analogies as a means for creating of religious concepts was considered
already in Kant's work, and Friedrich Karl Forberg consistently defended the legitimacy of this idea. For
details, see Vaihinger (1876), Parts IIIA and IIIB.)
At  the  end  of  Section  2.3.3.3,  Stachowiak  qualifies  the  “classical  representation/
reflection-realism” [klassischer Abbildungsrealismus] from the view-point of his model
theory:
“... kein  Mensch  anders  als  über  Modellbildungen  sein  Erkenntnisobjekt  erschließen  kann  und  ein
absoluter,  d.  h.  nicht  pragmatisch  zu  relativierender  Beurteilungsstandpunkt  gegenüber  der  Original-
Modell-Relation nicht nachweisbar ist.” (p. 240)
“… no one can access his/her  object  of cognition otherwise as  by means of model-building,  and an
absolute,  i.e.  pragmatically  non-relativized  assessment  point  towards  the  original-model-relationship
cannot be demonstrated.”
Thus, realism represents a non-attainable ideal [ein unerfüllbares Ideal] that cannot be
justified in any absolute sense.
4. Conclusion
The extremely elegant concise definition of modeling proposed by Rothenberg (1989),
in a sense, summarizes the above exposition of history:
“Modeling in its broadest sense is the cost-effective use of something in place of something else for some
cognitive purpose. … 
Modeling underlies  our ability to think and imagine,  to  use signs and language,  to  communicate,  to
generalize from experience, to deal with the unexpected, and to make sense out of the raw bombardment
of our sensations.” (p. 75)
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Jeff Rothenberg (1989)
Rothenberg emphasizes explicitly  replacing and  purpose as  the principal features of
modeling:
“Modeling in its broadest sense is the cost-effective use of something in place of something else for some
[cognitive] purpose. It allows us to use something that is simpler, safer, or cheaper than reality instead of
reality for some purpose. A model represents reality for the given purpose; the model is an abstraction of
reality in the sense that it cannot represent all aspects of reality. This allows us to deal with the world in a
simplified manner, avoiding the complexity,  danger and irreversibility of reality.” (p. 75, the attribute
“cognitive”, missing in the manuscript, was added in the published version).
Thus,  Rothenberg's  emphasis  is  on  modeling-by-simplification,  but  he  admits  also
modeling-by invention. For example, he refers to Medieval blood-letting as based on an
inappropriate model. Non-appropriate models cannot be “discovered”, they can only be
invented.
Rothenberg acknowledges the ubiquitous role of modeling in cognition as well:
“Modeling underlies our ability to think and imagine, to use signs and language, to communicate,  to
generalize from experience, to deal with the unexpected, and to make sense out of the raw bombardment
of our sensations. It allows us to see patterns, to appreciate, predict, and manipulate processes and things,
and to express meaning and purpose. In short, it is one of the most essential activities of the human mind.
It is the foundation of what we call intelligent behavior and is a large part of what makes us human. We
are,  in a word, modelers: creatures that build and use models routinely,  habitually – sometimes even
compulsively – to face, understand, and interact with reality.” (p. 75)
Aren't these two unifying ideas (“modeling as replacing for a definite purpose”, “all of
cognition is modeling”) worth of discussing? 
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